A recent report spearheaded by researchers at the University of Southern California blames theย largest greenhouse gas leak in U.S. historyย on dysfunctional management and poor regulatory oversight.ย Southern California Gasย (SoCalGas) is the company that operates the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility near the Los Angeles neighborhood of Porter Ranch,ย which suffered a catastrophic methane leak that lasted from October 2015 to Februaryย 2016.ย
โSoCalGas had lenient requirements for infrastructure record keeping, no comprehensive risk management plan, and no testing programs or plans in place to remediate substandard wells,โ concludedย Najmedin Meshkati, University of Southern Californiaย professor of civil and environmental engineeringย and senior author on the report. The study was published in the Journal of Sustainable Energyย Engineering.
In addition to its notable contribution to global warming, the massive methane leakย also required the evacuation of twoย schools and at least 8,000 residents for months while SoCalGas tried to stop theย leak.
Theย California Public Utilities Commission also issued a reportย evaluatingย the failed storage well at Aliso Canyon, and noted that โsevere external corrosion was observed in the failure areas.โ Based on these reports, it appears that SoCalGas had a policy of allowingย itsย gas storage wells toย operate until they failed,ย such asย at Alisoย Canyon.
DeSmog reached out to SoCalGas for comment on theย University of Southern California study but did not hearย back.
A History of Industryย Self-Regulation
In theory, outside inspectors could have potentially caught some of these safety issues during regular evaluations of theย infrastructure.ย But as the University of Southern California’sย report details,ย that is not how the natural gas storage industry operates in the U.S. Instead, its description of the circumstances leading to the leak reads as much like a recipe for future disaster as an analysis of past failures. Previously, theย industry has largely been allowed to self-regulate and the trend continuesย today.
This picture is reinforced byย a Government Accountability Office (GAO) auditย published in Novemberย 2017. Theย report reveals that about half of the nation’s active natural gas storage sites are overseen on a variable state-by-state basis, but as for the other half, which straddle stateย lines:
โPrior to 2017, the remaining 204 interstate natural gas storage sites were subject solely to federal oversight. However, the federal government had not issued safety standards forย them.โ
Slightly less than half of the 415 natural gas storage sites in America have been operating without safety standards or inspections by federalย regulators.
However, if SoCalGas had known that the well at Aliso Canyon was likely to fail, would the company have addressed the problem on its own? Apparently not, because according to its own company logs, SoCalGas had knownย about the potential for a leak in that particular well sinceย 1992.
No current regulations requireย safetyย shut-off valves on natural gas storage wells like the one that failed at Aliso Canyon. In an interesting twist of fate, Aliso Canyon’s failed well actuallyย had an underground safety valve,ย but SoCalGas removed it in 1979 and did not replaceย it, despite its own documents decades later noting the well was at risk ofย leaking.
Apparently, SoCalGas requested to raiseย customer rates in 2010 in order to make repairs and replace leaking safety valves, but its plan was to do so at a rate of only five percent of affected valves aย year.ย
โNewly uncovered information shows that Southern California Gas Company admitted five years ago it operated numerous leaking wells in Aliso Canyon, received a ratepayer increase to upgrade these wells, and yet deliberately failed to replace safety valves on its gas injection wells,โ said attorney Patricia Oliver, who is involved in one of the lawsuits about the incident, in Januaryย 2016.
In July 2017,ย James Mansdorfer, a former SoCalGas employee in charge of the wells at Aliso Canyon,ย highlighted additional risks associated with potential earthquakes at the gas storageย facility.ย
โMy belief is that there is potential for catastrophic loss of life, and in light of SoCalGas refusal to openly address this risk, my ethics just will not allow me to stand by without making the public aware of what could happen,โ Mansdorfer told the Los Angeles Dailyย News.
Status Quo orย Outlier?
According to the 2017 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit, other natural gas storage sites may poseย similar risks as Aliso Canyon due toย aging infrastructure or proximity to populationย centers.
The audit notes thatย many of these natural gas storage sites โare located within 3 miles of a city, town, or other populatedย area.โ
In addition, half of the โ17,000 wells that inject and withdraw natural gas from storage sites are more than 50 years old, and many wells are more than 100 years old.โ These older wells โwere often drilled for other reasons, such as oil and gas production, and are more likely to have age-related degradation, according to [the Department ofย Energy].โ
Inadequateย Interimย Regulationsย
Inย June 2016, just months after the Aliso Canyon incident, Congress passed the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safetyย (PIPES) Act,ย which requires the Department of Transportation (DOT) โto establish minimum safety standards for all natural gas storage sites by June 2018,โ according to the GAO report.ย As a result of the PIPES Act, the DOT‘s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issuedย an interim rule for safety standardsย and is responsible for finalizing thatย rule.
As the GAO audit points out, the interim rule is already potentially problematic.ย The first problemย is that these gas storage site regulations are only voluntary and based on industry recommendations, as noted in the audit, which takes a critical look at PHMSAโs regulatoryย oversight:
โUnder the interim standards, site operators are to follow industry-developed best practices to detect and prevent leaks and plan for emergencies, among otherย things.โ
This approach looks suspiciously similar to asking the natural gas storage industry, after causing the largest ever U.S. methane release, to regulateย itself once again. The PIPES Act also created anย Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Leak Task Force, whichย made several safety recommendations, including the following: ย ย ย
โOperators of natural gas storage sites should begin a rigorous program to evaluate the status of the wells, establish risk management planning, and, in most cases, phase out old wells with single-point-of-failureย designs.โ
Of course, recommendations outline whatย operators โshouldโ do to prioritize safety. However, recommendations do not provide guarantees or oversight that safety actions which should be done actually areย done.
Oil and Gas Industry Weighsย in
The task force also recommended โthat operators phase out most storage wells with single-point-of-failure designs โ where the failure of a single component, such as a well casing, could lead to a large release of gas โ by installing multiple points of control at each well.โ This would translate to SoCalGas and other storage site operators installing safety shut-off valves on all natural gasย wells.ย
Yet as detailed in the GAO audit, PHMSA did not require this practice in its proposed safety rule because the American Petroleum Institute, the oil and gas industry’s largest trade group,ย claimed โits recommended practices do not direct operators to phase out such wells because this practice may not significantly improve safety in allย cases.โย
As a result, regulators have chosenย to ignoreย a federally created safety task force in favor ofย following the advice of oil and gas industry lobbyists. But to fully appreciate the audacity of the lobbying groupโs claim that shut-off valves donโt necessarily improve well safety, you need to know the argument made to back up thisย claim.
The American Petroleum Institute citesย the Aliso Canyon disaster as an example of why phasing out wells with a single point-of-failture (i.e., those without shut-off valves) should not be required because, it says, such an approachย might not have prevented the accident. Instead, it recommends assessing the risks at each storage site and taking steps to reduce those risks, whichย โcould include installing multiple points of control for certain wells, among other possible mitigationย steps.โ
Meshkati,ย the senior author of the University of Southern California study, has a different take on how a shut-off valve might have changed the Aliso Canyon leak, which occurred at a storage well known as โSS-25.โ
โIf a functional kill valve were in place for well SS-25 in October 2015 when the leak began, the leak could have been stopped in a matter of hours or days rather than after four months,โ Meshkatiย said.
Audit Details Safetyย Ruleย Limitations
On top of thisย glaring example ofย the industry shapingย its own regulatory process, the GAO found that PHMSA was doing a poor job with the new safety rules. The audit notes the steps PHMSA has been taking to improve its oversightย isย limited in both scope andย strategy:
โFor example, PHMSA has not yet defined the level of performance to be achieved, fully addressed all core program activities, or used baseline data to develop its performance goal โฆ PHMSAโs goal focuses on training and does not address other core program activities, such as conducting effective inspections. For example, a goal to evaluate whether PHMSAโs inspections are effective could be to annually reduce, by a certain percentage, the number of sites not meeting minimumย standards.โ
Over two years after the Aliso Canyon disaster,ย the federalย officials in charge of improving the safety ofย U.S. natural gas storage have outlined vague and incomplete aspirations for improving safety, but one point they were clear on wasย that, as the oil and gas industry says,ย shut-off valves shouldn’t beย necessary.
PHMSA has come under fire from safety advocates before, with Rep. Jackie Speiers (D-CA) once referring to the agency as โa fluffy industry pet.โ And, in line with that assessment, PHMSA recently repealed regulations requiring oil trains to have modern brakes. Of course, PHMSA is now run by a former executive of freight train company CSX,ย and CSX is a big player in the oil-by-railย business.
โHow many more oil and gas disasters have to occur before a healthy culture of safety is implemented?โ askedย Meshkati in the press release accompanying hisย study.
The GAO audit hints that there is plenty of time to find out: โPHMSA published guidance on its website stating that it expects operators to make and implement plans to inspect and remediate risks found at their sites within 3 to 8 years following the effective date of the interim finalย rule.โ
So, business asย usual.ย
Main image: Aliso Canyon’s leaking natural gas storage well inย December 2015.ย Credit: Scott L,ย CC BY–SAย 2.0
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