Originally published by The Progressive.ย
Evan Vokes never gave any thought to whistleblowers beforeย realizing he would need to blow a shrill blast against his formerย employer, TransCanada, the company behind the controversial Keystoneย XL pipeline. As an engineer he takes his oath to protect publicย safetyย seriously.
Like Jeffery Wingand, the former tobacco industry insider-turned-whistleblower,ย Vokes is motivated by the consequences that industry’s reckless actions canย have on society, rather than by any personal vendettaย against TransCanada. But Vokes hasn’tย had the satisfaction ofย seeing the insider information he shared have an effect onย the pipeline industry, so his work is not yetย done.ย
Environmental groups have been pressuring President Obama toย reject the Keystone XL pipeline, a high capacity, high pressure line thatย would transport diluted bitumen from the Alberta tar sands to the Gulf of Mexico. Tar sands crude is more carbon intensive than conventional crude oil, as well as more corrosive, creating the potential that dilbit willย erode pipelines faster. Spills canย cause irreparable damage to water supplies, land values and ecosystems.
Vokes, in the pro pipelineย camp, has grave reservations about this too. But heย is primarily concerned about theย pipeline itself, so shoddilyย built that it may well poison aquifers and harm people’s health. President Obamaย has told the nation that his decision on the Keystone XL ย pipelineย will be based on whether or not it significantly increases carbonย emissions.
Vokes hopes that afterย TransCanada’s code violations becomeย public knowledge, the President will also give weight to theย projectโs integrity and address the risks of catastrophicย consequences.
TransCanada was already in trouble with Canada’s Nationalย Energy Board when Vokes started working for them in 2007. Three courtย orders had been served compelling the company to comply with pipelineย construction regulations they had been caught violating.ย
Part of Vokes’ jobย as a pipeline materials engineer was to insure the company compliedย with the court orders.ย To comply, theย company had to adhere to the accepted codes of pipeline construction setย by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Straying from the adoptedย code is not only illegal, it can compromise the integrity of a pipeline.ย ย
During his five years with the company, Evan Vokes did his best to getย TransCanada to identify and solve its problems. Some of Vokesโ suggestedย changes were accepted; others were not. Vokes persisted: He urgedย compliance to regulation to insure quality and safety;ย however the companyย continued to emphasize cost and speed rather than compliance.
Despiteย his efforts on behalf of reform, in 2011 Vokes foundย himself observing failures in multiple projects, includingย the Bison pipelineย that runs from Gillette, Wyoming to Mortonย County,ย North Dakota, and the Keystone 1, that runs from Hardisty, Alberta to Cushing, Oklahoma. Faulty welds, defective parts and rushed preparationย for the pipeline installations were causing problems.
The Keystone 1ย failed shortly after it began operating,ย sending an 80-foot oilย geyser into the air for 45 minutes until the landowner alerted TransCanada. Twentyย one thousand gallons spilled before the line was shut down. Anย automatic safety feature failed to detect the spill when the lineโsย pressure started spewing oil. Theย Keystone 1 had 14 leaks in itsย first two years of use. Shortly after the Bison pipeline was put into use, it ruptured and suffered an explosion blamed onย constructionย failures.
Pressure mounted as Vokes resisted signing off on flaws whichย went against his moral fiber and the engineering code of ethics that requires putting publicย safety before the interests of the company.
When his manager ordered himย to stop his investigations in Marchย 2011, Vokes persisted, uncoveringย an ever increasing scope of wrongdoing. In October 2011, he wrote toย TransCanada CEO Russ Girling, offering his own mid-year assessment afterย Girling welcomed employee input.
โ I have to quit or fight,โ heย told hisย boss.
โIt is with greatย mirth that I see the quarterlyย mention of the disappointing project and yet no one at the corporateย level makes mention of why did these projects fail and who was heldย accountable. Instead we see promotion for those that say โYesโ as we makeย the regulator madder.ย We task those who were instrumental in the failureย with investigating themselves and if you dare speak of what happenedย it is classed as personal attacks on fellowย employees.โย
He listed all theย things he was trying to do, the positive changes that TransCanada hadย embraced since he began, and the shortcomings which were still too largeย for Vokes toย accept.
A few days later, he was put on what TransCanada deemedย stress leave. Nevertheless, Vokes felt compelled to finish whatย he started, attempting to remedy the problems from theย sidelines.
Vokes sent damning evidence of code violations to theย Association ofย Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta, theย Canadian National Energy Board and to the U.S. Department ofย Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materialsย Safety Administration (PHMSA).
He was fired when he returned toย work.
Though the Canadian National Energy Board has acknowledged theย validity of Vokes’s claims, little action has been taken to compelย TransCanada to impose corrective measures. Now Vokes blew his whistleย in other directions: to the Canadian Senate and the U.S.ย State Department,ย to the press, and the landowners directly affected.
For anyone whoย wants to understand the dangers of a pipeline not built to code, Evanย offers a crash course. โThere is no worse position than beingย ignorant of the problems that affect us. I look atย education as freedom toย achieve and to fend off tyranny,โ Vokesย says.
Vokesโs actions prompted the Canadian Senate to invite himย to participate in their study of the current state of pipeline safety. Onย June 6, 2013, Vokes testified,
โTransCanada Pipelines has aย culture of non-compliance and deeply entrenched business practicesย thatย ignore the legally required regulation and codes. The mix ofย political and commercial interests allows industry to claim they exceedย federal requirements when they are building substandard pipelinesย with no enforcement or accountability in theย process.โ
He gaveย theย governing body evidence: copies of TransCanada reports, companyย emails, photos and the National Energy Boardโs own court orders that stillย had not been followed.
On June 11th, the Senate called Iain Colquhoun,ย the chief engineer of the National Energy Board,ย and TransCanada’s viceย president Dan King to testify, asking them to answer Vokesโ charges.ย Colquhoun skirted the questions, avoiding many of them. King claimed thatย since a part of Vokesโ job was to identify any problems, itย was only natural that he found codeย compliance issues. Once theyย were identified they were fixed, King said, but Vokesโ evidence refutesย this position. King also stated, โThere is no benefit toย TransCanada, financial or otherwise, of cutting corners on safety orย compliance.โ
But there is. Cutting corners byย focusing on speedyย construction can substantially reduce construction costs in a veryย expensive business. No money is made until a pipeline is in operation.ย It is unclear what the Canadian Senateโs next step will be. Their final report wonโt beย released untilย autumn.
In the United States, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHSMA) has Vokesโ evidence and a mountingย pile of reports that detail incidents on the Bison and Keystone 1ย pipelines, in addition to anomalies (the industry’s term forย defects) found in the newly built southern route of Keystone XL.ย
TransCanadaย insists these problems are routine and that they have takenย corrective measures. Although TransCanada is fixing mistakes in the field,ย such defects point to systemic quality control issues. For example, onย October 17, 2012, during a mandatory test of Keystone 1,ย inspectorsย found a problem serious enough to force TransCanada toย take the line out of production for almost a week. TransCanada released aย statement describing the problem as a small anomaly. But thatย claim has not been proven, and there are rumors that aย large portionย of the pipeline had to be replaced due to a failure in construction thatย had the potential to cause a major leak. PHSMA has not releasedย information about the cause of the shutdown, despite being repeatedlyย questioned byย journalists.
This spring, the first tests of the Keystone XL southern routeย detected anomalies. Vokes is not surprised. They’re finding a lot of themย since they are caused by not following construction code.ย ย
TransCanada spokesman Shawn Howard disagrees. He insists thatย theย increased number of anomalies found is normal sinceย they are building the pipeline to a higher standard than other pipelines,ย following 57 special conditions they accepted to get this project anย initial green light โ another claim that remainsย unsubstantiated.
Site where an anomaly repair was taking place in Douglas Texas (credit: Julieย Dermansky)
Vokes testified at a State Departmentย public hearing inย Nebraska in Aprilย 2013:ย
โTransCanada keeps insisting the Keystone XL pipeline willย be the safest pipeline ever built despite irrefutable evidence to theย contrary. In factย they are building the southern portion of theย Keystone XL to the lowest permissible standards, just as they have theย Keystone 1 and the Bison Pipeline,โ he said during anย impassioned speech, bringing the audience to theirย feet.
In June, Vokes visited Texas to attend the U.S. Department ofย Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administrationย pipeline safety awareness conference and to investigate reports ofย anomaly repairs on the Keystone XL southern route. He still hadย hope thatย the U.S. regulatory agency might act more aggressively than the Canadianย National Energy Board. He left the conference discouraged afterย listening to representatives mislead concerned citizens about theย real dangers they will face by having a defectiveย pipeline run throughย their communities. ย
PHSMA spokesperson Jeannie Layson told Vokesย that PHMSA will no longer be able to refer to the code they areย currently tasked with enforcing. President Obama signed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 into law. Public Law 112-90 says, โSection 24 of the Act requires, within one year of enactment (January 2013), that PHMSA no longer incorporate, in whole or in part, voluntary consensus standards by reference into its regulations unless those standards have been made available free of charge to the public on the Internet.โ
Thisย new law goes into effect in January 2014 and essentially deregulatesย the entire pipelineย industry. Since the American Society of Mechanical Engineer code is notย available at no cost online, PHSMA cannot insistย on currentlyย mandated standards. In 2014, the pipeline industryย will have sole responsibility forย determining and monitoring their own quality standards inย construction.
โThe risks they could take for every pipeline in theย United States are staggeringโ Vokesย says.
While in Texas Vokes visited some of the directlyย impactedย landowners,ย explaining parts of the code to them and pointing out how what was supposedย to happen differed from what was actually taking place. ย
On Davidย Whitleyโs property where one anomaly was cut out, photosย provedย the pipeline had been laid in a ditch on top of a boulder, a practiceย that is not only contrary to code but a sure way to produce aย dent. ย
He also met with activists who have been documentingย the repair process and reviewed their images to explain when, whereย and how the code was not being followed and what the outcome wouldย be.
In a statement to the media, TransCanada claimed they found nineย anomalies that would need to be cut out of one 81 mile portion of theย pipeline. That figure contradicts the findings of activistsย who documentedย dozens of anomaly sites and multiple cut out sections of pipe.ย
Vokes flew over the area and confirmed that much of the finishedย portions of the pipeline are now back under construction. He has neverย seen a project with this many repairs.ย
TransCanada’s Shawn Howardย would not release the actual number of anomalies, nor would PHSMA. Howardย stated, โ It doesn’t matter how many sections are fixed as longย as they are fixed.โ ย
But again Vokes disagrees. ย Newlyย introduced segments of pipe lessenย the integrity of theย pipeline.ย
โThe new welds required to replace pipe where sections have been cut out,ย known as final tie-in welds, will be the weakest links inย the pipeline, much in the way that a chain is only asย strong as the weakestย link.โ
If the work isnโt done rightย the second time, no one will know until it is too late. No matter how manyย repairs are made, the pressure test thatย proves the strength and serviceability of the pipelineย in the first place won’t be done again. A new test is not required afterย the repair process,ย Howardย confirmed.
Evan Vokes explaining construction code to David Whitley in Winnsboro Texas (credit: Julieย Dermansky)
In Beaumont, where the final section of the southern route ofย the Keystone XL is being installed, Vokes observed new pipeline sectionsย whose coating was already deteriorating. Code requires that the coatingย on all pipelines must be damage free; the coating is thereย to protect the pipeline from corrosion.
Burying improperly coatedย sections potentially creates yet another dangerous shortcoming in theย pipeline, currently destined to be put into use whether orย not the northern route is approved. The southern route of the Keystone XLย will tie into the Keystone 1 pipeline in Cushing, Oklahoma. If theย northern route is approved, it will be a short cut with a greaterย capacity for moving tar sands crude. Even if Keystone XL is rejected,ย that wonโt stop TransCanada from moving tar sands crude from Canada to theย Gulf ofย Mexico.
Vokes was once optimistic that he couldย help make sure that Keystone XL would be built right. Evenย if there were problems, he was in a position to change the cultureย of TransCanada from the inside. But that proved impossible.
He now thinks it is highly unlikely thatย anything will stopย this flawed project. The risks of allowing the project to moveย forward are great, so he keeps trying to get the informationย he has already shared with the regulatory agencies out toย theย public.
โThe United States is getting a substandard product, oneย withย an undisclosed number of replacement parts, not a pipeline thatย exceeds safety standards, despite TransCanadaโs repeated claims. Think of it like this: if you bought a new luxury car and it had toย go back under warranty because of several major drivetrainย problems but they repaired it with used parts, would you have the best carย or would you just have aย lemon?โ
Though his goal of convincing TransCanada to clean up its actย has not been achieved, Vokes reflects that at least theย authorities that could implement regulations to stop a faulty productย from being put into use know the truth. They cannot claim ignorance whenย thingsย start to go wrong.
Once tar sands spill into an aquifer, it canโt be fixed. You can’t return your pipeline and have the environmentย restored. There is no lemon law forย pipelines.
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